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NOTES
Labor Law: The "Compelling State Interest" Exception to the
Federal Preemption Doctrine: The growth of national business and
labor organizations greatly influenced political and economic change in
the early 1900's. Strife between these giants eventually posed a clear
threat to interstate commerce, an interest which Congress has express
Constitutional authority to regulate. Prior to Congressional action,
states passed laws regulating labor controversies, which were then
invoked in such disputes. Therefore, when Congress finally enacted
legislation, it became inevitable that questions of federal preemption of
state enactments would arise.
One of the most recent cases raising the issue of preemption is
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America.' William C. Linn was
an officer of a company which the defendant union sought to unionize.
Linn instituted a libel action in a U.S. District Court based upon leaflets
circulated by the defendant, accusing the employer and Linn, as a manager, of depriving union members of their right to vote. The written
statements, Linn contended, were known by the defendant to be false
and defamatory. No actual or special damage was alleged, but Linn
prayed for recovery on the ground that the statements were libelous
per se.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction, and this
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that:
. . .the exercise of state jurisdiction .. . would be a "merely
peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act,"
provided it is limited to redressing libel issued with knowledge
of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or
false. Moreover, . . . 'an overriding state interest' in protecting

its residents from malicious libels should be recognized in these
circumstances.3
To properly analyze the Linn decision, it is necessary to examine the
background of federal preemption in labor regulation. Two views exist
as to federal labor legislation. While one holds that labor regulation
requires national laws to achieve consistency and uniformity, the other
maintains that variances in local circumstances necessitate different laws
in each state. Congress took a moderate view, though it leaned toward
the former opinion, and enacted legislation adopting a policy of "positive
protection of labors' right to organize"4 with the passage of the Wagner
3Linn v .United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 55 (1966).

2Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964).
3Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966).
4 MILLs & BRowN, FRoM THE WAGNER AcT ToO ATr HAR-LEY, 3 (1950).
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Act.5 The later Taft-Hartley Act is credited with having "federalized
the law, ' 6 giving much authority to the National Labor Relations Board,
as well as providing expressly that the Board's authority "shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been
' 7
or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise.
None of the federal labor laws, however, contain any express provisions preempting state legislation. Cox and Seidman have written that
Congress should ideally define areas it desires preempted by its enactments, but they note that:
.. . it is the practice for Congress to avoid the decision, thus
leaving the problems to the Supreme Court. And the court,
paradoxically, then draws the necessary lines by asking-in form
if not in actuality-where Congress drew them."
In addition, as the general rule is that Congress' intent to preempt state
laws must be clearly manifested before the Supreme Court will preclude
similar unconflicting state regulations, 9 one would expect to find much
co-existence of state and federal labor laws. The general trend is, however, toward suspension of state authority, 10 and this trend has decreased
the availability of state remedies not otherwise provided for in the
federal law.
Several types of conduct that may be tortious were governed and
thus preempted by the N.L.R.A.. Section 8(a) of the Act states that:
"it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7.'"12 Section 8(b) reads: "it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents . . . to restrain or coerce . . .

employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."113 Both
of the preceeding relate to N.L.R.A. section 7 "rights of employees,"
which insures employees' freedom to join or refrain from participation
in labor organizations. 14 Restraint and coercion, made unfair labor
5 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1935). The Wagner Act
was supplemented by the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §147 et seq. (Supp.
1950) and further amendments in 1959.
6 MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 4, at 441.
7 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §160 (a) (1964).
8 Cox & Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. REV. 211, 236
9 (1950).
Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) ; Kelly v. Washington,
302 U.S. 1 (1937). See Mo. Pacific Railway v. Lavabee Mills, 211 U.S. 612

(1909); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).

10 Note, Labor Law-Federal and State Jurisdiction, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 468

(1952).

SE.g., Oss v. Burmingham, 58 L.R.R.M. 2754 (1965); Linn v. United Plant

Guard Workers, 337 F.2d 68 (1964); Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S.
690 (1963) ; Ornamental Iron Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963)
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
1229 U.S.C. §158 (a) (1) (1964).
1329 U.S.C. §158 (b) (1) (1964).
1429 U.S.C. §157 (1964).
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practices by the preceeding two sections, are often accomplished by
tortious acts. A person may be coerced by an assault, for example, and
thus one act may be both a tort and an unfair labor practice concurrently. Congress was cognizant that some of these unfair labor practices
were also tortious acts, but it had no intent to displace state remedies by
the federal law.
That Congress believed state and federal remedies would still be
available to victims of tortious conduct constituting unfair labor practices is evidenced by this statement of the committee in considering the
Taft-Hartley Act:
Some of these acts are illegal under state law, but we see no
reason why they should not also constitute unfair labor practices.
(Emphasis added.)' 5
Senator Taft, co-sponsor of the bill stated:
•.. suppose there is duplication in extreme cases; suppose there
is a threat of violence constituting violation of the law of the
state, why should it not be an unfair labor practice? There is no
reason in the world why there should not be two remedies for an
act of that kind. (Emphasis added.) 16
Because of this belief that two remedies were available, Congress made
no attempt to provide general compensation for the victims of tortious
acts. The N.L.R.B. was given no general compensatory powers at all,
and its injunctive powers are clearly not useable to compensate victims.' 7
With Congress providing no compensation in the belief that states'
remedies were still available to tort victims and with the Courts consistently holding that the federal labor enactments preempted state tort
remedies, the law evolved to a position where only N.L.R.B. control
remained. Thus the Board was without the power to grant victims
adequate relief.' 8
The law of torts, designed to compensate victims in these situations,
was unuseable here, save in two situations. First, the N.L.R.B. could
cede jurisdiction to the state, thereby allowing victims access to tort
remedies.' 9 Secondly, a state could gain jurisdiction if it had a compelling interest in regulating the conduct involved .2 0 Such state interest
was found only in cases of violence or threats of violence. 2' In these two
15 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 as to S. 1126
16 93 CONG. REc. 4024 (1947) (80th Cong. 1st Sess.).
17 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 63

(c) (1964).

(1947).

(1966) ; 29 U.S.C. §160

I' International Union UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954); Amalgamated Utility

Workers v. Consolidated Edison, 309 U.S. 261 (1940).

'9 Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); 29 U.S.C. §160 (a)

(1964).
Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693-694 (1963).
U.S. 301 (1964); Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S.
690 (1963); San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) ; also
see cases cited in footnote 36.

20 Plumbers Union v.
21 Liner v. Jafco, 375
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instances, then, dual federal and state remedies were available, 2 but
this left a large area without adequate available remedies.
A libel case not involving threats of violence could not be commenced
in state courts if arguably involving unfair labor practices, since there
would be no compelling state interest. 23 Such cases, when brought before
the N.L.R.B., were found generally to involve acts protected by the
liberal free speech provisions of the N.L.R.A., and thus no redress
at all was available.2
More liberal free speech was allowed by the N.L.R.A. because
invectives were traditionally employed in labor bargaining and were
thought unavoidable.2 5 Congress apparently felt that hampering speech
in labor disputes could only result in a proliferation of law suits, stifling
free bargaining.
Epithets have been common in labor disputes, and the Board,
following Congress' intent, has generally found them protected by the
N.L.R.A.'s free speech provision, section 8(c), even though the epithets
were erroneous and defamatory. 26 The N.L.R.B. has drawn some limits,
though, and it has indicated it would decide differently if statements
were uttered with actual malice, "a deliberate intention to falsify" or a
"malevolent desire to injure. ' ' 27 Section 8(c) provides:

The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression
28
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.

In interpreting this provision, the Board stated it "tolerates intemperate,
abusive and inaccurate statements made by the union during attempts
to organize employees," but it "does not interpret the act as giving
either party license to injure the other intentionally by circulating defa22

Brenan's Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1964); Monroe Auto Equipment Co., 146
N.L.R.B. 1267 (1964); Youngstown Cartage Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 305 (1964);
Edro Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 875 (1963).
23Record Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Seattle Typographical Union, 59 L.R.R.M.
2200 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1965); Teamsters Local 150 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.)
56 L.R.R.M. 2993 (1964) ; Schnell Tool and Die Corp. v. United Steel Workers, 200 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio Com. P1. 1964), 55 L.R.R.M. 2945; Blum v. International Association of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964) ; Hill v.
Moe, 367 P.2d 739 (Alaska 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 916 (1957).
24N.L.R.A., 61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. §158 (c) (1964) provides "the expressing
of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof . . . shall
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
25 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26 E.g., Bettcher Manufacturing Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526 (1948) ; Atlantic Towing
Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1169, 1170-73 (1948).
27 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966). See: Stewart
Warner Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1158 (1953) ; Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the N.L.R.A., 78 HARV. L.
Ray. 38, 66 (1964).
2829 U.S.C. §158 (c) (1964).
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matory or insulting material known to be false." 29 Thus, this section
of the N.L.R.A. has generally protected name-calling in labor bargaining
from N.L.R.B. sanctions.
At this juncture, with little chance of libel victims getting redress
in state courts or from the N.L.R.B., the Laburnum case was decided
by the United States Supreme Court.3 0 The Court therein decided that
an injured party was entitled to recover damages in a common-law tort
action against three labor unions whose tortious acts were unfair labor
practices at the same time. The language in the opinion appeared heartening as the court ruled state tort remedies were available to the victims
of tortious conduct during labor bargaining. The Court's words seemed
to extend state remedies to all tort victims. In rejecting the union's
contention that the N.L.R.A. preempted state tort remedies, the Court
said:
[t]he contrary view is consistent with the language of the
Act and there is positive support for it in our own decisions and
in the legislative history of the Act ....

To the extent

. . .

that

Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no
ground for concluding that existing criminal
penalties
3

. . .

for

tortious conduct have been eliminated. 1
32
But this ray of sunshine was quickly dispelled with the Garmon case,
decided shortly after Laburnum, which again denied the use of tort
remedies to victims of tortious acts arguably constituting unfair labor
practices absent violence or threats of violence. The Court again saw the
need for uniform regulation of labor of primary importance and possible
only through a single tribunal. Only exceptional circumstances were
seen as permitting state tort remedies, and these circumstances were
defined as "conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the
public order. ' 33 These apparent contradictory decisions were distinguished as Laburnum was pointed out to have been an action "based on
violent conduct."-' Thus, it was clear that absent a compelling state
interest, found only in "intimidation and threats of violence," 35 an
activity arguably subject t'o the N.L.R.B.'s jurisdiction precluded state
courts from exercising jurisdiction.
Courts considering the permissibility of state jurisdiction over acts
arguably constituting unfair labor practices, absent violence or the
threat of violence, concluded that the area had been preempted generally
2

oLinn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966); See Maryland
Drydock Co. v. Labor Board, 183 F2d 538 (1950).
30United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
3' Id. at 664-665.
32 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
Id. at 247.
at 248 (footnote 6).
35 d.at 248.
3

341d.
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and cited Garmon as the controlling decisions. 3 6 It was generally concluded that even though the N.L.R.B. declined to exercise its jurisdiction, the state courts were still precluded from taking cases arguably
subject to the Board's authority.3 7 Only one court read the Garmon rule
as allowing states to exercise jurisdiction over a libel action even though
it appeared the acts were protected by the N.L.R.A.. This court exercised
its jurisdiction, concluding that a valid state interest that did not transgress federal policy existed in the libel action.38 In view of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Garmon rule in the later Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers, this was a most perspicacious though singular
opinion.
In the Linn decision, the Supreme Court discussed the exception to
the preemption rule for cases of compelling state interests-and stated:
"We similarly conclude that a State's concern with redressing malicious
libel is 'so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility' that it fits
within the exception specifically carved out by Garmon."39 Inadequacy
of the N.L.R.B. remedies were discussed as the Court stated, "The
injury that the statement might cause to an individual's reputationwhether he be an employer or a union official-has no relevance to the
Board's function.14 0 A need for a private remedy in malicious libel was

seen by the Court, as the "Board can award no damages, impose no
penalty, or give any other relief to the defamed individual."4 1
The fact that the Board has no authority to grant effective relief
aggravates the State's concern since the refusal to redress an
otherwise actionable wrong creates disrespect for the law and
encourages the victim to take matters into his own hands. The
of libel suits in preventing violence has long been recogfunction
4 2
nized.

The Court, however, allayed opponents' fears that libel suits could be
used "to dampen the ardor of labor debate" by limiting the availability
v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301 (1964); Teamsters Local 150 v. Superior Court
of Sacramento County (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.) 56 L.R.R.M. 2993 (1964) ; Plumb-

36Liner

ers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963) ; International Association of Iron

Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963) ; Construction and General Laborers
v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); Marine Engineers v. Interlake Co., 370 U.S.
173 (1962); In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); San Diego Building Trades

Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S.
131 (1957) ; Meatcutters v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20 (1957) ; Guss v. Utah
Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957) ; Teamsters Union v. New York,
New Haven and Hartford R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 155 (1956) ; Weber v. Anheuser
Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) (summarizes earlier cases on this point).
3 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) ; Garmon
v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 353 U.S. 26 (1957); See also Liner
v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964); Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690
(1963); Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
38 Meyer v. Joint Council 53 Teamsters, 58 L.R.R.M. 2183 (Pa. Super. Ct., 1965).
39 Linn

v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).

401d. at 63.
41 Ibid.
42 Id. at 64 (footnote 6).
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of suit to "those instances in which the complainant can show that the
defamatory statements were circulated with malice and caused him
43
damage.1
What then does the Linn decision change? It certainly broadens the
concept of "compelling state interests." In examining several decisions
it can be concluded that regulation of violence and threats of violence
still arouse clearly compelling state interests, 4 whereas the control of
peaceful picketing does not.4 5 Obscuring the definintion of these areas,
however, is the fact that most cases have contained several types of
conduct in combination. These combined activities were decided to have
(or not to have) aroused a compelling state interest in such regulation
so that often no one action can be isolated and pointed to as singularly
sufficient to arouse this interest. From Supreme Court decisions on this
point, it is apparent that states may regulate combined activities involving or threatening: 1) the public safety and order and the use of streets
or highways,4 6 2) massed name-calling, picketing, intimidation, and
threats "calculated to provoke violence," 47 3) threats of physical injury,
mass picketing, blocking egress and ingress to a place of employment,
and blocking highways,48 4) mass picketing with threats of violence and
the prevention of ingress to a non-union employer, 9 5) the maintenance
of domestic peace generally, 50 and now 6) malicious libels with actual
damages caused thereby.51 States have been found to have no overriding
interest in the regulation of: 1) peaceful picketing or 2) picketing and
52
pressuring prospective customers.
The Linn decision is, to this author, a further step toward the proper
treatment of labor disputes in a federal system, and for the present it
outlines the extent of the compelling state interest in malicious libel
as an exception to the preemption doctrine. Reconsideration and change
of labor law concepts are not unheard of. In a decision after Linn, on
March 28, 1966, the Supreme Court directed that in the area of violence
and threats of violence "the permissible scope of state remedies .. .is
strictly confined to the direct consequences of such conduct, and does
431d. at 64-65.
41U.A.W. v. Russell,

356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S.
131 (1957); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954); Allen Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315

U.S. 740 (1942).

4SLiner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964); Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373
U.S. 690 (1963); Local 438 Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542
(1963); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
46Allen Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740

(1942).
4 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957).
48Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1952).
49U.A.W.
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
50
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964) ; Plumbers
5 1 Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693 (1963).
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
52San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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not include consequences resulting from associated peaceful picketing
or other union activity." 53 The court stated that this rule only applies
when peaceful and violent conduct are separable,' but, in view of this
decision and the narrow majority in the Linn decision (5-4), the new
Linn rule may be precariously perched, especially since the Linn majority saw fit to comment that if it should become necessary to "prevent
impairment of the policy" needed for national labor regulation "the
Court [would] be free to reconsider today's holding."55
WILLIAM

J.

DUNAJ

Constitutional Law: The Validity of Eavesdropping Under the
Fourth Amendment: In Berger v. State of New York,' the petitioner
was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to bribe the chairman of
the New York Liquor Authority. The state's case against Berger was
based upon information and leads obtained by means of eavesdropping
devices surreptitiously concealed in the offices of two co-conspirators.'
The eavesdropping 3 was authorized by ex parte court orders issued pur4
suant to section 813-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedures.
The petitioner, in his defense, alleged that section 813-a is unconstitutional in that it (1) permits trespassory intrusions into Constitutionally
53 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729 (1966).
54 Id. at 730.
5
5Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 67 (1966).
1Berger v. State of New York, 87 S. Ct. 1873 (1967).
2Id. at 1876.
3 The term eavesdropping used in this article shall refer to electronic "bugging"
as distinguished from wiretapping.
4 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. 813-a. Ex parte order for eavesdropping: "An ex parte
order for eavesdropping as defined in subdivisions one and two of section seven
hundred thirty-eight of the penal law may be issued by any justice of the
supreme court or judge of a county court or of the court of general sessions
of the county of New York upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or
of the attorney-general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant of any
police department of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, that there
is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained,
and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded and the purpose
thereof, and, in the case of a telegraphic or telephonic communication, identifying the particular telephone number or telegraph line involved. In connection
with the issuance of such an order the justice or judge may examine on oath
the applicant and any other witness he may produce and shall satisfy himself
of the existence of reasonable grounds for the granting of such application.
Any such order shall be effective for the time specified therein but not for a
period of more than two months unless extended or renewed by the justice or
judge who signed and issued the original order upon satisfying himself that
such extension or renewal is in the public interest. Any such order together
with the papers upon which the application was based, shall be delivered to
and retained by the applicant as authority for the eavesdropping authorized
therein. A true copy of such order shall at all times be retained in his possession by the judge or justice issuing the same, and, in the event of the denial
of an application for such an order, a true copy of the papers upon which the
application was based shall in like manner be retained by the judge or justice
denying the same. As amended L.1958, c. 676, eff. July 1, 1958."

